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ABSTRACT
Corruption features prominently in assessments of the governance, performance and 
capacity of South Africa’s public service. However, accounts of corruption too often 
fail to offer systematic appraisals of its occurrence within the diverse institutional 
makeup of the public service. This article seeks to address this gap by investigating 
the relationship between the level and type of corruption, and the institutional 
characteristics of government departments. Based on an original dataset which 
assembles published data on financial misconduct, staffing and budgetary information, 
the article examines whether the institutional makeup of national departments render 
some more susceptible to corruption than others. The findings highlight the multi-
dimensional nature of corruption, indicating that departmental risk should not simply 
be judged on its cumulative or aggregate effect: how much corruption do departments 
sustain, but incorporate the proportional effect of corruption: how much does it 
matter? Indicators such as overall staff size, ratio of supervisory to non-supervisory 
staff and functional orientation are necessary but insufficient indicators of corruption 
risk, whilst budget size appears to have little bearing on increased risk; although there 
is more, though not unequivocal, reason to be concerned about departments with a 
higher percentage of their budgets allocated to goods and services spending.
INTRODUCTION: ANTI-CORRUPTION ENFORCEMENT AND 
CORRUPTION RISK IN SOUTH AFRICA’S PUBLIC SERVICE
The pervasity of corruption is well documented across the array of government, academic 
and grey literature on South Africa’s public service. In response to the problem, the 
country has adopted a law-enforcement/organisational control approach to combatting 
corruption, comprising a mix of statutory, policy and institutional measures (Naidoo 
2013). Statutory reforms include the passage of a Prevention and Combating of Corrupt 
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Activities Act (Number 12 of 2004) which contains a relatively extensive legal definition 
of corruption applying to both the public and private sectors. It also distinguishes ‘general’ 
from more activity-specific instances where corruption is alleged to have taken place, 
including through contractual as well as procurement/tendering instruments. Specific anti-
corruption legislation has been augmented by general public sector regulations containing 
anti-corruption provisions. This includes a Code of Conduct that stipulates conduct that 
officials are barred from engaging in (e.g. relating to corruption and misuse of official office 
for private ends). The Regulations were later amended (Government Gazette 2001b) to 
include provisions requiring the disclosure of financial interests by senior public servants 
and rules governing the acceptance of gifts.
Other measures to address corruption include the publication of a Public Service Anti-
Corruption Strategy (DPSA 2002). This document refers to ‘dimensions of corruption’ 
described as the ‘various forms in which corruption manifests itself in the Public Service and 
elsewhere …’ This includes ‘embezzlement’ (theft of resources by persons entrusted with 
authority and control of resources); ‘fraud’, which relates to deceitful or dishonest actions 
by public officials which derives a personal and therefore undue benefit; and ‘conflict of 
interest’, which essentially relates to a public servant’s public duties being employed to 
benefit him/her privately (DPSA 2002:7-8). These acts have legal roots in public finance 
legislation (e.g. Public Finance Management Act, Number 1 of 1999) and its accompanying 
Regulations, which specifically contain provisions concerning the misuse of public funds 
through unauthorised, irregular-including tendering procedures, fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure, and the prevention of fraud (Government Gazette 2001a).
The existence of a law enforcement/organisational control framework have not prevented 
weaknesses from appearing in the public sector’s internal capacity to combat corruption. 
In its government-wide appraisal of the strategic policy priorities for South Africa, the 
National Development Plan (NPC 2011:401) acknowledged that ‘high levels of corruption’ 
are undermining governance in a context in which the state’s response has been ‘uneven’. 
In a 2003 corruption country assessment report, the Department of Public Service and 
Administration (DPSA) and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2003:7, 67) also 
observed that the ‘public sector has uneven capacity to enforce and comply with the [anti-
corruption] legislation’, especially in the areas of risk management and fraud prevention.
In a subsequent critique of the public sector’s anti-corruption capacity, the DPSA 
(2008:25) observed that although departmental capacity had generally increased through an 
expansion of measures to prevent and combat corruption, internal capacity also varied across 
departments. Weaknesses existed in investigative capacity and detection through weak 
compliance with whistle-blowing measures. In response, the DPSA (2006) published criteria 
requiring public sector departments to meet a minimum set of anti-corruption standards. 
The ‘minimum anti-corruption capacity requirements’, or MACC, covers a spectrum of 
corruption responses, including prevention, detection, investigation and resolution measures. 
The MACC criteria can be traced to the 2002 PSACS, which called for increased institutional 
capacity to fight corruption. An audit of departmental anti-corruption capacity quoted in a 
report by an inter-departmental anti-corruption co-ordinating committee (DPSA not dated), 
revealed the extent of the public sector’s failure to put in place requisite standards, and 
highlighted the varying capacity that existed across departments. In a sample of eighty-five 
national and provincial departments, 57% had a dedicated anti-corruption unit; 30% had 
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a whistle-blowing policy and mechanism in place; and only a minority of departments in a 
smaller sub-sample had what was described as advanced investigative capacity.
A more recent PSC (2011b) report sought to profile and analyse the nature and scale of 
corruption by identifying the most common manifestation of corruption experienced by 
national and provincial departments. The Commission sampled nine national departments and 
departments from three provinces in the period 2004 – 2010, and found similar unevenness 
in anti-corruption response. This included only half of respondents indicating that their 
departments had ‘clearly written objectives’ for fighting corruption; the same proportion 
indicating that their department’s anti-corruption units were under-capacitated; and as much 
as 80% of respondents stating that their department’s anti-corruption units had ‘unclear 
responsibilities and powers to investigate cases of alleged corruption (PSC 2011b:8-10).
Despite formal statutory and regulatory efforts introduced to combat corruption, along with 
a recognition that uneven capacity exists to enforce these measures, there is lack of research 
on the consequences of uneven capacity for mitigating corruption risk. As a result, there is a 
gap in understanding the institutional risks to sustaining corruption in the public service.
METHODOLOGY
This research examined institutional risk to corruption in the public service, by investigating the 
relationship between the level and type of corruption recorded in government departments, 
and their core functional characteristics. It was specifically interested in learning if and 
how significant these features are in explaining levels and types of corruption. The primary 
source material consisted of quantitative data comprising the number of cases of ‘financial 
misconduct’ recorded per department. This information has been regularly collected and 
published by the Public Service Commission (PSC). A variety of other quantitative data on 
the functional characteristics of government departments was also sourced and collated, 
such as staff size, staff composition, budget size and budget composition. By statistically 
relating these two sets of data, it was possible to draw impressions about the association 
between the amount and type of corruption sustained by a department, and key elements of 
its institutional makeup. This relationship provided impressions about institutional risk.
Departments functioning at the national level of government comprised the population 
for this study. Whilst the initial population numbered 33 departments, due to zero financial 
misconduct cases being recorded for some departments, including zero or limited cases 
recorded for new departments created after a 2009 cabinet restructuring, the population 
was finally reduced to 27 departments. Data was collected on departments over a five-year 
time-span, from 2006/7 – 2010/11. It was not possible to expand the timeframe beyond 
2010/2011. The PSC (2013) published a financial misconduct report for the period 2011-
2012, however, it noted that up to nineteen national departments reported a ‘nil’ report for 
that period, meaning that no financial misconduct cases were finalised. This would have 
made year-on-year comparison difficult with previous years. Furthermore, the PSC has not 
published financial misconduct reports beyond the 2011/2012 period.
The dependent variable in this study represented cases of financial misconduct documented 
by national departments. Financial misconduct is a generic term which covers ethical, 
criminal and financial management offences as prescribed by public finance legislation. As 
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such, it comprises several sub-categories including ‘corruption’, as defined in the Prevention 
and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act (2004); ‘fraud’; ‘financial mismanagement’; ‘gross 
negligence’; ‘theft’; ‘fraud’; and ‘misappropriation and abuse’. Corruption is therefore just 
one of several ethical and administrative transgressions which make up financial misconduct, 
although the term is often employed generically to describe any and all misconduct.
The independent variables comprised a mixture of core departmental functional 
characteristics. These included:
●● Total staff, which served as an indicator of a department’s human resource 
management burden to police unethical conduct by its members;
●● Staff composition: supervisory versus non-supervisory personnel, measured by the 
number of individuals employed in the ‘senior management service’ as compared to 
all other staffing categories. This was calculated as a ‘staffing ratio’, which measures 
the number of senior managers per 100 other employees. This served as an indicator 
of a department’s management oversight burden in policing corruption, which speaks 
to principal-agent arguments in the corruption literature (e.g. Klitgaard 1988).
●● Budget size, which served as an indicator of a department’s financial management 
burden, given that financial misconduct is often measured in monetary costs/losses. 
In this regard, internal financial management systems to control resource use has been 
counted amongst improved administrative practices to combat corruption (Langseth, 
Stapenhurst, Pope 1999:133)
●● Budget composition: departmental budgets were also broken down into the proportion 
of funds appropriated for ‘goods and services’ spending, in order to test the susceptibility 
to tender/contract/procurement corruption. Procurement has been described as being 
‘particular[ly] … notorious for the levels of corruption attained by dishonest politicians 
and officials’ (Pope 1999:114).
Data on the dependent and independent variables was captured and analysed in a Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheet.
Quantitative data on the independent variables was mainly sourced from departmental 
annual reports which, by-in-large, publishes this information in a standard format. Data 
on the dependent variable (financial misconduct) was obtained directly from the PSC 
through a written request, and supplemented by the Commission’s published financial 
misconduct reports.
The limited number of recorded corruption cases for most departments coupled with 
a limited population made anything more than a descriptive statistical enquiry unviable. 
As such, statistical analysis was limited to frequency distributions for individual variables 
which in some instances allowed for ratios between certain variables. As a result, the ability 
to attribute institutional risk factors to the frequency of corruption in either a correlative 
or causal sense was not possible. Having said this, no previous research has attempted 
to statistically relate cases of corruption to the functional characteristics of public service 
departments in South Africa. Therefore, the value of this research is that it can at least 
confirm or discount, through a systematic comparison between the amount of corruption 
in a department and its functional makeup, the risk profile that departments exhibit in 
comparison to their counterparts. A further limitation is that it was not possible to obtain 
a departmental breakdown of financial misconduct cases by type for the reporting year 
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2006/7. This level of disaggregation is not available in the published PSC report, nor was it 
possible to obtain it directly from the Commission.
The following caveats should also be noted. This study deliberately excluded provincial 
government departments, for which financial misconduct data is available and is typically 
published by the PSC alongside national departments. This exclusion was intentional in 
order to maintain parsimony in the dataset and minimise the scope of statistical analysis to 
test the significance of the relationship. Depending on initial results obtained at a national 
level, the author intends to expand the dataset to provincial departments. Finally, as the 
dependent variable for this study is defined by finalised cases of financial misconduct, or 
in other words, represents cases of misconduct that have been formally investigated by 
departments, this study cannot claim to represent all potential or unreported misconduct 
occuring in departments. There is a wide quantitative variance between allegations of 
financial misconduct, such as those reported through anonymous hotlines, and cases 
formally investigated by departments. In the former case, a PSC (2011a) report documenting 
cases of ‘alleged’ corruption reported to the National Anti-Corruption Hotline between 2004 
and 2010, recorded 3 545 reports of corruption referred to national departments.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The first query shows the results of the total cumulative cases of financial misconduct over 
the five year period (2006/7 – 2010/11), by department. As shown in figure 1.1, the great 
majority of departments recorded less than one hundred cases with little deviation between 
them. The exception was the Departments of Justice and Constitutional Development 
(DJCD), Defence (DoD), and Correctional Services (CS), which together accounted for 66% 
of the total. The bars representing these departments are shaded in black.
Figure 1.1: Cumalative financial misconduct cases by department, 2006/7 – 2010/11
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Figure 1.2 excludes these three departments and shows the distribution of cases for 
departments with less than one hundred cases. There are at least three discernible clusters of 
departments: Home Affairs (HA), the South African Police Service (SAPS) and Department 
of Labour (DL); the departments of Arts, Water, Land, Public Works, Social Development; 
and the remainder.
Figure 1.2: Cumalative financial misconduct cases by department, 2006/7 – 2010/11
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Source: Public Service Commission, in response to an information request by the author on 
types of financial misconduct reported by national departments, 2012.
Figure 2: Most prevalent type of financial misconduct by department
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The subsequent analysis concentrated on the first two clusters together with the 
DJCD, the DoD and CS, totalling eleven departments. The bar graph results for this sub-
set of departments are shaded in black in the following figures to separate them from the 
remainder of the population. The intention was to subject this sample of the total population 
with relatively higher number of cases to more detailed analysis. Although the cut off mark of 
less than twenty cases was arbitrary, it did enable a more focused look at a salient segment 
of the population. An initial impression that can be drawn from these eleven departments 
is that institutions responsible for law enforcement, including safety, security and criminal 
justice (e.g. SAPS, Defence, Justice, Correctional Services, Home Affairs) appeared more 
susceptible to corruption, followed by institutions responsible for economic development 
(e.g. Labour, Land Affairs, Public Works) and social protection (Arts, Social Development, 
Water). Pope’s (1999:114) listing of government activities most commonly associated with 
corruption also included areas such as policing and immigration.
The next query sought to observe the most prevalent type of financial misconduct. For 
this question, data on the type of misconduct cases recorded for national departments was 
analysed for specific years, as supplied to the author by the PSC. The ‘most prevalent type’ 
of misconduct for each national department in specific years was defined as that category 
which constituted the largest single group in a given year.
Although the department numbers are limited on this measure, the data indicates that 
more departments cited fraud as the most prevalent type of misconduct in all years except 
for 2010. In its report on the most common manifestation of corruption, the PSC (2011b: 
31-32) also cited fraud, together with bribery, as the most prevalent types of corruption, 
but distinguished amongst types of fraud relating to services such as identity document 
applications, social grants, and RDP housing. Of the three departments overseeing these 
services: Home Affairs, Social Development, and Human Settlements, two were in the 
sub-sample of departments with the highest number of cases, with the other–Human 
Settlements–just outside this group.
In comparison to fraud, other categories of financial misconduct held steady or showed 
some upward movement, including financial mismanagement–with the exception of 2010, 
misappropriation and gross negligence. Theft also remained generally constant, although at a 
relatively lower level. The shape of this graph suggests that departments remain susceptible 
to various forms of more sophisticated types of misconduct (i.e. if we exclude theft) that 
pertain to unlawful as well as irresponsible and excessive use of public assets, and might be 
worryingly indicative of shortcomings in mitigation efforts.
The most recently available secondary source to have evaluated national department 
anti-corruption mitigation efforts is a study conducted for the DPSA (2010) on compliance 
with the MACC framework. The author obtained a copy of the study although it has never 
been publicly released by the DPSA. As such, it is not possible to cite data from the report. 
Having said this, and based on a more general impression of the overall compliance 
ranking that national departments obtained, it was evident that anti-corruption efforts vary 
widely across departments, averaging out at what the authors classified as a ‘reasonable’ 
level. It was however pointed out that most individual departments had scores which were 
only ‘moderately’ compliant, or below the reasonable level. Rankings for our sub-set of 
eleven departments which recorded the highest number of misconduct cases were not, 
as might be assumed, clustered at the bottom of the scale, but were counted amongst the 
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majority of moderately compliant departments. Only eight of the eleven departments in 
the sub-set had a ranking in the MACC audit, and three were judged to have reasonable to 
strong compliance.
While it is evident that most national departments were muddling through in response 
to anti-corruption enforcement, which is consistent with weaknesses in mitigation efforts, 
it is also apparent–when isolating our sub-set of eleven departments–that there is no clear 
pattern that matches the weakest compliance with the highest misconduct. This invites 
Figure 3.1: Average staff size of departments, 2006/7 – 2010/11
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Figure 3.2: Average staff size of departments (cont.), 2006/7 – 2010/11
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further questions about how the efficacy of departmental enforcement measures is tested by 
their operational conditions.
The next set of queries attempted to relate the number of misconduct cases by department 
to core functional characteristics including staffing profile, budget size and composition. 
These features are the mainstay of any public administration system and operate at the 
frontline of both corruption risk and mitigation.
The first query looked at overall staff size. Departments were positioned in order of 
staff size, where particular attention was paid to the sub-set of departments with the largest 
number of misconduct cases. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 shows the average staff size of departments, 
encompassing the five-year study period. The Department of Agriculture was excluded as 
the size of its staff increase in 2010/11 would have skewed the result.
The figures show that departments with the highest number of recorded misconduct cases 
tend to also be the departments with the largest staff contingents. This was evident in eight of 
the eleven departments in the sub-set. The departments of Social Development and Arts and 
Culture were notable exceptions, falling in the lower half of the staff size distribution. One way 
of interpreting this finding is that departments carrying large staff complements are geared 
towards more labour-intensive direct goods and services provision, rather than focused on policy 
formulation, oversight, support and regulation. For instance, the PSC (2011b:25) has argued 
that ‘… a department whose core business represents services/items that are of great value, or 
touches upon deeply vested human interests may be more susceptible to acts of corruption’. It 
cited examples of how departments transacted with the public, e.g. inmates bribing officials of 
Correctional Services to improve their conditions, clients bribing officials of the DHA for identity 
documents, and clients bribing officials of Social Development for social grants.
One means of testing this interpretation is to categorise national departments according 
to their core business, as having a predominately policy focus or an implementation focus. 
Although this might be a crude distinction to make, and risks playing into the disputed policy/
implementation dichotomy, it could reinforce the significance of staff size on corruption risk 
by classifying departments by their primary functional orientation. Features or indicators 
which distinguish policy-focused from implementation-focused departments might include 
the proportion and makeup of staff rendering services directly to the public, a breakdown 
and description of a department’s programming areas, and the extent of a department’s 
institutional decentralisation, i.e. network of geographically-dispersed satellite offices. 
Departmental annual reports were again analysed for the median year in this study (2008/9) 
to inform these indicators. The findings showed that ten of the eleven departments in the sub-
set, with the exception of Social Development, can be classified as having an implementation 
focus, thereby confirming a strong link between staff size and functional orientation.
One shortcoming of the staff size-misconduct relationship is the obvious and perhaps 
intuitive belief that departments sustaining higher cases of financial misconduct will 
necessarily employ more people, as corruption is perpetrated by human resources. In an 
effort to control for this, an additional query sought to measure a department’s misconduct 
cases as a direct proportion of its staff size.
It would also test the importance of core business or functional orientation. The results 
are shown in figure 4 and again exclude the Department of Agriculture.
The results show a dramatic contrast with figures 3.1 and 3.2, where the sub-set of 
eleven departments are no longer clustered at the top end of the size scale, but when 
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misconduct is measured as a proportion of each department’s size, are dispersed throughout 
the population. Moreover, it is also evident that within the sub-set, departments that did 
not have the highest staff size experienced proportionally more misconduct, notably the 
departments of Arts and Culture and Social Development. This, when coupled with the 
fact that several departments which were not in the sub-set also sustained proportionally 
more misconduct, indicates that absolute size and functional orientation are insufficient 
indicators of misconduct risk. In other words, risk is not one dimensional, but should also 
incorporate proportional effect. It also reinforces the importance of understanding how the 
prevailing operational conditions in individual departments affect their mitigation efforts. 
Moreover, when financial misconduct is measured as a direct proportion of an individual 
department’s staff size, policy oriented departments are more heavily represented.
Another perspective on the staff size – misconduct relationship is based on the staffing 
ratio in departments, which looks at the breakdown of supervisory and non-supervisory 
staff. The theoretical significance of this measure stems from assumptions in principle-agent 
approaches to anti-corruption enforcement, emphasising the importance of oversight and 
enforcement capacity represented by senior or supervisory officials (i.e. principals) policing 
misconduct amongst their subordinates (agents). The staffing ratio of each department was 
obtained by calculating the number of senior managers per 100 other employees. This was 
then averaged out for the five year period.
Figure 5 averages the staff ratio in departments over the five year study period. The 
departments of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs, and Justice, were excluded 
as they each experienced a significant rise in the number of senior managers in specific 
reporting years, which would have skewed the result. The Department of Agriculture was 
also excluded for the reason mentioned earlier, where staff ratio is a function of overall staff 
number. The higher the average staff ratio figure, the higher the number of senior managers 
per other staff.
Figure 4: Ratio of misconduct cases to average staff size of departments
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The results show that departments with relatively fewer numbers of senior managers are also 
those departments with the highest number of misconduct cases, thereby affirming the principal-
agent argument. As many as eight of the eleven departments in our sub-set were at the bottom-
end of the average staff ratio scale. The departments of Social Development and Arts and Culture 
again stood out from the rest of the subset. One conclusion that can be drawn is that departments 
with fewer numbers of principals relative to the size of their agent corps risk higher levels of 
misconduct, leading to the proposition that increasing the staff ratio will reduce misconduct risk. 
This assumes however that senior managers will always play the role of good principals, or anti-
corruption enforcers, and aren’t themselves implicated in financial misconduct. This has in reality 
been challenged both in the literature (see Persson, Rothstein 2013; Langseth, Stapenhurst, Pope 
1999) and empirically in the PSC’s financial misconduct reports. Between the period 2006/7 and 
2009/10 these reports showed that the number of misconduct cases involving senior managers 
was greater than their proportional share of total public service employment, despite the largest 
number of cases being committed by non-supervisory staff. In this regard, increasing the staff 
ratio seems a necessary but insufficient response to reducing misconduct risk.
A further set of results looked at the relationship between financial misconduct and 
departmental budgets. Financial misconduct is committed by human resources; hence the 
importance of staff size and composition, but it primarily results in financial gain for those 
individuals involved. Therefore, does the size and composition of a department’s budget tell 
us anything about its susceptibility to misconduct? In figure 6, departments were compared 
against the size of their budgets, based on the final appropriation of funds averaged across 
the five reporting years. The departments of Minerals and Energy, Sport, Treasury and the 
Presidency were excluded from the results because large year-to-year swings in their budgets 
would have skewed the result.
The result indicates that budget size does not increase the risk of experiencing more 
financial misconduct, or, there is no consistency between departments with the highest 
Figure 5: Average staff ratio in departments, 2006/7 – 2010/11
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number of recorded misconduct cases and departments with the largest budgets. This is 
in clear contrast to average staff size. The sub-set of eleven departments with the highest 
cumulative cases was spread throughout the budget spectrum. This might, in one sense, be 
explained and even expected, where the number of financial misconduct cases may be more 
sensitive to the risk of misconduct being committed as the number of potential offenders’ 
increases, as opposed to the pool of resources available.
In another sense however, it could be postulated that budget size may be a potentially 
significant risk factor to misconduct if the focus is not on the number of cases sustained but 
on the value of the losses incurred. In this regard, departments with larger budgets may be 
more susceptible to higher value misconduct offences where budget size may act to mask the 
scale of offences. This study attempted to quantify the financial cost (in Rand value losses) of 
financial misconduct, as this data is available in the PSC’s published reports. Unfortunately, 
it was not possible to compile full five-year data for the total population, owing in part to 
gaps in yearly figures. In addition, a scan of the available figures also showed that for most 
departments the cost of financial misconduct could swing widely from year to year, making 
it an unstable variable to measure misconduct risk across the population.
A final effort to drill down into the relationship between financial misconduct and 
departmental budgets looked at the composition of budgets. There is a strong public 
perception in South Africa that a considerable amount of corruption occurs in departmental 
tendering, contracting or supply chain management, which typically involves the 
expenditure of funds to procure or produce goods and services. This has resulted in terms 
such as ‘tenderpreneur’ becoming commonplace in public discourse around corruption. 
The PSC (2011b:25; 31-32) acknowledged this by citing amongst the types of corruption 
recorded in the public sector, bribery linked to individuals seeking departmental tenders, 
and procurement irregularities. According to guidelines published by the National Treasury 
(2004:11), supply chain management/tendering refer to the ‘acquisition and disposal of all 
Figure 6: Average budget size of departments (Rand, billions), 2006/7 – 2010/11
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goods, services, construction and road works and movable property’. In sum, that portion of 
a department’s budget used for the acquisition and production of goods and services may 
be especially susceptible to corruption. It can therefore be assumed that departments with 
a relatively high proportion of their budgets made up of goods and services spending will 
also tend to have relatively high financial misconduct cases. This assumption was tested by 
recording the amount of a department’s ‘goods and services’ spending, which is listed as a 
separate line item under the appropriation statement in departmental annual reports. This 
amount, which was first averaged across the five-year reporting period, was then calculated 
as a percentage of the average total departmental budget. The results are given in figure 7.
The results appear inconclusive, but also evocative. On the one hand, the sub-set of 
eleven departments is again spread across the population, rather than being clustered at 
the high percentage end. On the other hand, the majority of these departments are more 
narrowly dispersed and concentrated in the upper half of the scale, in comparison to figure 
7, lending some, although not significant, impetus to believe that the acquisition or disposal 
of goods and services by government departments increases the risk of misconduct.
CONCLUSION
Measuring corruption risk in South Africa’s public service has revealed a mixed set of 
findings, highlighting the multi-dimensional appearance of corruption from an institutional 
perspective. One overarching impression made visible in this analysis was the importance 
of distinguishing between the cumulative or aggregate effect of corruption, which can 
be likened to the question: how much, and the proportional effect of corruption, which 
perhaps prompts us to ask: how much does it matter? Recognising this distinction should 
Figure 7:  ‘Goods and Services’ as a percentage of total departmental budgets 
(average between 2006/7 – 2010/11)
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not undercut the importance of anti-corruption enforcement and mitigation efforts to reduce 
the cumulative effect of corruption, but suggests that this should not be advocated in an 
unqualified and undifferentiated manner. Indeed, when compared against available data on 
anti-corruption enforcement capacity, it was clear that the level of misconduct experienced 
did not match the strength of enforcement regimes, where most departments displayed 
neither weak or strong enforcement but were middling their way through.
From an aggregate view of corruption, as measured by the cumulative number of financial 
misconduct cases, the findings showed that those departments in the law enforcement/criminal 
justice sector; those departments with the largest staff contingents and those which are more 
implementation-oriented were more susceptible to corruption. When cumulative misconduct 
cases was measured as a proportion of the size of individual departments however, there was 
a dramatic difference in the results, indicating that when controlling for difference in staff size, 
a higher number of misconduct cases does not necessarily translate into either the greatest 
effect or confirm a higher risk for implementation-oriented departments.
A similar finding, although not as explicit, was evident when measuring departmental 
staffing ratios, which looked at the breakdown of supervisory and non-supervisory staff. On 
the one hand, those departments which recorded the highest financial misconduct cases 
also had the lowest staffing ratio, or fewest supervisory to non-supervisory staff, affirming the 
importance of oversight capacity to combat corruption. On the other hand, data collected 
by the PSC on financial misconduct cases by salary levels has consistently shown that senior 
managers have been charged with misconduct at levels above their proportional makeup of 
public service employment.
There was no consistent relationship between the amount of corruption sustained by 
departments and the size of their budgets, signalling that at an aggregate level, how much 
(in budget size) doesn’t appear to matter. When misconduct was compared to the portion 
of departmental budgets allocated to goods and services spending, the results showed that 
there was more, although not unequivocal, reason to believe that departments with a higher 
proportion of their budgets allocated to goods and services are at greater risk of misconduct.
Finally, there is considerable scope for expanding this analysis in future research by 
including provincial-level data on misconduct, which has also been collected by the PSC; 
and by expanding the number of independent variables to include more process-oriented 
indicators, such as departmental performance management and audit outcomes.
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